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The Dynamic Impact of Market Integration: Evidence from Renewable Energy Expansion in Chile

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Abstract

We study the static and dynamic impacts of market integration on renewable energy expansion. Our theory highlights that statically, market integration improves allocative efficiency by gains from trade, and dynamically, it incentivizes new entry of renewable power plants. Using two recent grid expansions in the Chilean electricity market, we empirically test our theoretical predictions and show that commonly-used event study estimation underestimates the dynamic benefits if renewable investments occur in anticipation of market integration. We build a structural model of power plant entry and show how to correct for such bias. We find that market integration resulted in price convergence across regions, increases in renewable generation, and decreases in generation cost and pollution emissions. Furthermore, a substantial amount of renewable entry would not have occurred in the absence of market integration. We show that ignoring this dynamic effect would substantially understate the benefits of transmission investments.

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1 Introduction

Effective and economical expansion of renewable energy is one of the most urgent and important challenges of addressing climate change. The electricity sector generates one of the largest shares of global greenhouse gas emissions along with the transportation sector.¹ Furthermore, a significant part of the transportation sector is expected to be electrified in the near future. Decarbonizing electricity generation is therefore critical to addressing climate change.

However, many countries are facing a fundamental challenge in expanding renewable energy because the existing network infrastructure (i.e., the transmission grid) was not originally built to accommodate renewables. Conventional power plants, such as thermal plants, were able to be placed reasonably close to demand centers (e.g. large cities), and therefore, minimal transmission networks were required to connect supply and demand. However, renewable energy, such as solar and wind, is often best generated at locations far from demand centers.

Two problems arise from the lack of market integration between renewable-intensive regions and demand centers. First, when renewable supply exceeds local demand and cannot be exported to other areas, electricity system operators have to curtail electricity generation from renewables to avoid system breakdowns, even though this means discarding zero-marginal-cost and emissions-free electricity. This curtailment indeed occurs in many electricity markets, and growing number of markets are experiencing negative wholesale market prices when there is excess renewable supply.² Second, because the marginal cost of renewable electricity is near zero, local market prices in renewable-intensive regions tend to be low when it cannot be exported to demand centers. These two problems discourage new entry and investment in renewable power plants. Many countries consider these challenges as first-order policy questions. For example, the Biden administration in the United States explicitly included investment in transmission lines and renewable energy as a key part of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act ([117th Congress, 2021](#)), which included approximately 1.75 trillion US dollars in spending.

We examine this question by providing theoretical and empirical analyses on the impacts of market integration on renewable expansion and allocative efficiency in wholesale electricity markets. We begin by developing a simple theoretical model that characterizes the static and dynamic impacts of market integration. In the static scenario, we assume that market integration does not affect producers' entry decisions. In this case, the value of market integration can be summarized by a conventional definition of gains from trade. Market integration allows lower-cost power plants to export and replace production from higher-cost power plants, which results in an improvement in allocative efficiency. However, this conventional approach does not incorporate the potential dynamic impact of market integration. When producers can anticipate market integration, they have incentives to invest in new production capacity that will be

¹Electricity and heat production accounts for 25% of the 2010 global GHG emissions and transportation accounts for 14% ([IPCC, 2014](#)). In the United States, 29% of the GHG emissions in 2019 comes from the transportation sector and 25% comes from the electricity sector ([EPA, 2020](#)).

²For example, California's wholesale market experienced negative prices 10 percent of the time in 2017 ([California ISO, 2018](#); [Cicala, 2021](#)). Wind power is often curtailed in electricity markets in Texas and Spain. The Japanese electricity market experienced large-scale curtailment of solar power in the Kyushu region, which has limited transmission connection to other parts of the country.

profitable in the upcoming integrated market. This investment effect changes the supply curve of production, which results in an equilibrium that is different from the static case. Our model shows that this dynamic impact of market integration can be substantial, and ignoring this impact could understate the impact of market integration.

With this insight, we empirically quantify these theoretical predictions by exploiting two large changes recently occurred in the Chilean electricity market. Until 2017, two major electricity markets in Chile—Sistema Interconectado Norte Grande (SING) and Sistema Interconectado Central (SIC)—had been completely separated with no interconnection between them. Recently, this separation has been recognized as an obstacle to expanding renewable energy because renewable-intensive regions (near Atacama desert) are located far north from demand-centered regions (near Santiago, the capital city) and completely disconnected with another demand center (mining industry) near Antofagasta. To address this problem, the Chilean government completed a new interconnection between Atacama and Antofagasta in November 2017, and a reinforcement transmission line between Atacama and Santiago in June 2019.

Not only do these expansions provide a unique research environment to apply our theoretical and empirical framework to study the impact of market integration, but the Chilean electricity market also offers another unique advantage in the comprehensiveness of its data. We are able to collect nearly all of the data relevant to market transactions, including hourly unit-level marginal costs, hourly node-level demand, hourly node-level market clearing prices, hourly unit-level electricity generation, and plant characteristics such as capacity, technology, year built, and investment.

We begin by presenting visual and statistical evidence of the static impacts of market integration on wholesale electricity prices, production, and cost. First, we show that the market integration resulted in price convergence across regions. Before the market integration, we observe that SING and SIC often had substantially different market clearing prices. In addition, within SIC, the Atacama desert region often became an isolated local market when its solar production exceeded the local demand and could not export to other regions. We show that the market integration substantially reduced this spatial price dispersion by increasing prices in renewable-intensive regions and decreasing prices in demand centers.

Second, we investigate the static impacts of market integration on electricity production and costs. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we find that market integration provided gains from trade—lower-cost power plants, including renewables, increased their production and replaced production from higher-cost plants, resulting in a decrease in the overall cost of electricity generation per megawatt hour.

Third, we examine how market integration affected new entry of renewable capacity. We find that a rapid growth in renewable capacity started right around the first *announcement* of market integration in 2014, which was three years before the completion of the interconnection in 2017. Despite the fact that the node prices in renewable-intensive regions became near zero before the interconnection, we observe continuing entries of renewable power plants in this period. This evidence suggests that renewable investors made their investment decisions based on the *anticipation* of market integration. This evidence also suggests that the static analysis, which cannot capture the potential impact on

anticipatory investment in plant capacity, is likely to understate the impact of market integration, as it is suggested by our theory.

To investigate the potential dynamic impacts of market integration, we build a structural model of power plant entry. In the model, investors consider investment for a new power plant based on the expected value of long-run profit from the investment. The net present value of investment depends on profit from subsequent years. A key element of the future expected profit is transmission constraints from its local region to other regions. The attractiveness of the Chilean market is that its simple geography makes the network model tractable and makes it feasible to conduct counterfactual analysis. We simulate a few counterfactual policies on transmission capacity expansion and examine each policy's impact on solar entries, market prices, generation costs, and consumer surplus.

Our counterfactual simulations reveal several findings. First, our static result suggests that the market integration in Chile increased 17% of solar generation relative to the counterfactual case with no market integration. This is because in the absence of market integration, the system operator would have had to curtail excessive amount of power from solar due to transmission constraints. Second, this number still understates the impact on solar investment because a substantial amount of solar investment would have become unprofitable without market integration due to low market prices. We simulate the market equilibrium to find the maximum level of solar capacity investment that could be positive in the net present value, given the discounted rate and duration of investment used by the Chilean government's public infrastructure projects. Our dynamic result suggests that the full impact of market integration on solar generation was a 51% increase in solar generation, as apposed to the 17% increase if we ignore this dynamic impact.

Our results indicate that both the static and dynamic impacts of market integration are important factors in the evaluation of transmission investment. In our context, we find that the static effect itself resulted in 9% and 4% reductions in electricity generation cost per megawatt hour in hour 12 (a solar-intensive hour) and all hours, respectively. If we incorporate the dynamic effect on solar investment, these reductions in generation cost are 12% and 5%. Our results also indicate that both the static and dynamic impacts play key roles in the price convergence across regions.

Our theory and empirical findings suggest that the conventional event study approach, which estimates the effect of transmission expansion by comparing data before and after a grid expansion, is likely to underestimate the benefit of market integration if power plant entries occur in anticipation of integration. We explore how to correct for such dynamic bias in the event study framework. Our idea is that we can use the structural model to correct for the timing of anticipatory investments and then estimate the event study regression. We show that this dynamic correction addresses the attenuation bias created in the standard event study regression, and that the corrected event study regression is able to produce results numerically similar to the results obtained by counterfactual simulations with the structural model.

Finally, we investigate if the costs of transmission investments can be justified by its long-run benefit for consumers. We show that ignoring the dynamic effect of market integration substantially understates the benefit of trans-

mission investments. Furthermore, reductions in environmental externalities provide an additional benefit of market integration in our case. Including the dynamic impact and environmental benefit, our main analysis suggests that the cost of transmission expansion can be recovered in less than 5.5 years with the discount rate at 5.83%.

Related literature and our contributions—Our study builds on three strands of the literature. First, several earlier studies on wholesale electricity markets develop theoretical models on the impacts of transmission expansion ([Bushnell, 1999](#); [Joskow and Tirole, 2000](#); [Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft, 2000](#); [Joskow and Tirole, 2005](#)). Notably, theoretical models in these studies often start with a hypothetical example of two disconnected electricity markets—“North” and “South”—and consider the integration of these two markets. The grid expansions in Chile provide an empirical analogue to these hypothetical settings, which allows us to test predictions from these theoretical models. In addition, previous studies generally focus on static impacts and do not explicitly incorporate potential impacts on the entries of new power plants. Our theory incorporates this dynamic effect and highlights that the dynamic impact on power plant entry and investment can be crucial to examine market integration.

Second, our paper is closely related to [Mansur and White \(2012\)](#) and [Cicala \(2022\)](#), which study how the introduction of market-based dispatch mechanisms affected allocative efficiency in the US electricity markets. Our study is also related to research on the role of transmission lines in electricity markets. For example, [Wolak \(2015\)](#), [Ryan \(2021\)](#), and [Burlig, Preonus and Jha \(2022\)](#) study the competitive and efficiency effects of transmission. [Davis and Hausman \(2016\)](#) examines how the impact of a sudden nuclear power plant closure on market efficiency interacts with transmission constraints. While our paper benefits from insights from this literature, our research question is different in three folds. First, we study the impact of market integration by itself, keeping the dispatch mechanism unchanged. In our setting, the two separated markets in Chile had the same dispatch mechanism before the integration, and this mechanism did not change after the integration. This allows us to isolate the effects of market integration from the impacts of dispatch mechanisms. Second, we focus on the role of market integration on renewable investment rather than the competitive impacts of transmission. Third, previous studies in this literature generally focus on the allocative efficiency in a static scenario in which the set of power plants are considered to be fixed. Our paper explicitly considers both of the static and dynamic impacts of market integration by incorporating a dynamic impact on power plant entries. Finally, our study shows that a commonly-used event study approach might understate the benefit of transmission lines, and we provide a method to correct for such bias.

Third, our project relates to recent studies on the role of transmission expansion in renewable energy policy. For example, [Fell, Kaffine and Novan \(2021\)](#) finds that relaxing transmission constraints between the wind-rich areas and the demand centers in Texas increased the environmental benefit of wind because the transmission expansion allowed wind to offset pollution near highly populated areas. Our study contributes to this literature in two ways. First, we show that transmission expansion incentivizes the new entries of renewables, and therefore, estimating both of the static and dynamic impacts of market integration is important to quantify the full benefit of transmission investments

on renewable expansion. Second, in addition to non-market environmental benefits, we also evaluate the benefits on a variety of market outcomes in a wholesale electricity market, such as market prices and generation costs. We find that the economic benefits of market integration on these outcomes are substantial because renewable expansion can significantly lower the system-wide costs and prices of electricity when it is combined with transmission expansion. In our cost-benefit analysis, we show that incorporating the dynamic effect substantially changes the cost-benefit of transmission investments.³

Finally, our study provides important policy implications for renewable energy policy around the world. The lack of market integration between renewable-intensive regions and demand centers has become a major obstacle for decarbonization in many countries, including the United States (Cicala, 2021). Chile is one of the very first countries that have tackled this problem by enhancing electricity market integration. Our empirical evidence from the Chilean electricity market suggests that market integration not only helps renewable energy to be transmitted to demand centers but also incentivizes new entries and investment of renewables, which is a crucial market force to accelerate decarbonization.

2 Theoretical Framework

Our goal is to understand the static and dynamic benefits of integrating markets, and how to recover them from data. To understand the challenge, it is useful to provide some intuition with a stylized example, which is represented in Figure 1. Imagine there are two regions, North and South, which are operating in autarky. The North region has lower costs. Equilibrium prices in autarky are given by $p^N < p^S$. In the static model, we assume that market integration does not affect renewable investments. In this case, the equilibrium from integrating markets with full trade is given by p^* . Costs on average fall (gains from trade), prices in one region (weakly) go up, and prices in the other region (weakly) go down. When compared to the outcomes under autarky, the gains from trade are given by the classical triangle marked in dots (the triangle e^S , e^N , and e^*), which can be compared to the costs of building the line for a full cost-benefit evaluation.

[Figure 1 about here]

Imagine now that the Northern region is also the one with the best available solar resources. In the absence of a transmission line between North and South, such resources might not be profitable, but they would be attractive if the two regions were interconnected. Once the two regions are interconnected, new investment enters the market in the anticipation of the profitable environment. In Figure 1, we represent the equilibrium outcome after renewable plants are built in the North. Under full trade, the dynamic equilibrium would be e^{**} with the equilibrium price p^{**} . The

³Another related study is Rivera, Ruiz-Tagle and Spiller (2021), which studies the effect of increased solar production on health outcomes in Chile, although this study's focus is not transmission expansion.

cost savings from this new equilibrium are described by the whole shaded area. To get at the full dynamic gains from trade, one would need to compare these benefits to the costs of building the line and the costs of the solar investment.

From an empirical perspective, it is useful to compare the costs of production before and after the transmission line is expanded. From Figure 1, and in the absence of solar investment, the benefits from the expansion should clearly identify the static gains from trade. In a model without frictions, incremental investment (the causal part of the investment) happens exactly when transmission is expanded, and thus the dynamic gains from trade can also be identified. However, in the presence of frictions, the timing of expansion might not coincide perfectly with investment. Consider a situation in which investors enter the market before the transmission line is fully developed in anticipation of the change, as in our application. Under such a scenario, a comparison of the “before-and-after” market outcomes in a commonly-used “event study design” could lead to the conclusion that the static gains from trade equal the larger shaded triangle (the triangle e^S , $\hat{e}^N$, and e^{**}). This calculation will understate the gross cost savings but it would also miss to account for the fact that solar investments would not have been profitable during the “before” period alone.

More generally, we expect the static approach to underestimate gross cost savings in the presence of differential timing. Note that this is also true if investment were delayed, as cost savings would not include any dynamic impacts in the event window. When it comes to price differences, the static approach will overestimate the impacts of the transmission line on price convergence in the presence of anticipated investments as long as $p^N < p^S$. Early investments will increase such a price difference, which will tend to converge after expanding the grid. Price reductions will be generally understated. If investments are delayed, the new price would be p^* as opposed to p^{**} , understating price reductions. The price reduction will also be understated in the presence of anticipated investment, as early solar investment tends to depress average prices in the “before” period.

To show these economic predictions more formally, we derive the equilibrium equations under a stylized model with linear marginal cost functions that we can solve in closed form. Assume there are two regions $r = \{N, S\}$ with demands $D^N \leq D^S$ and marginal cost functions $C^N(q^N) = \beta^N q^N$ and $C^S(q^S) = \beta^S q^S$, where q^N and q^S represent non-solar production in each region. For simplicity, consider the case in which $\beta^N \leq \beta^S$ so that under autarky $p^N \leq p^S$, as in Figure 1. We will compare the equilibrium under market integration (full trade) and autarky (no trade).

In autarky, the equilibrium is trivial and given by the intersection of the marginal cost curve and demand.

$$p^N = \beta^N D^N, q^N = D^N, p^S = \beta^S D^S, q^S = D^S.$$

Define total demand as D . In the absence of solar investment, equilibrium outcomes under full trade are given by:

$$p^* = \frac{\beta^N \beta^S}{\beta^N + \beta^S} D, q^N = \frac{\beta^S}{\beta^N + \beta^S} D, q^S = \frac{\beta^N}{\beta^N + \beta^S} D.$$

Importantly, we also consider endogenous investment in solar in the presence of market integration. Assume there is some cost to solar production, c , which can only be built in the North region.⁴ For simplicity, assume $p^N < c < p^*$, so that investment only occurs under market integration. We also assume that entry of solar follows a zero profit condition. In this new environment, the equilibrium solar production becomes,

$$q^{solar} = D - \frac{\beta^N + \beta^S}{\beta^N \beta^S} c.$$

Intuitively, solar covers any demand not produced by the regions at price $p^{**} = c$, which becomes the equilibrium price under full trade.⁵

If investment is anticipated, but market integration has not yet occurred, the equilibrium is modified also under autarky. Taking q^{solar} as given, the autarky equilibrium with anticipated investment becomes,

$$p^N = (1 + \frac{\beta^N}{\beta^S})c - \beta^N D^S, \quad q^N = \frac{\beta^N + \beta^S}{\beta^N \beta^S} c - D^S, \quad p^S = \beta^S D^S, \quad q^S = D^S.$$

The price and non-solar production in the North will be smaller in this new equilibrium with anticipation, while prices and production in the South remain at the same level in autarky.

Armed with this basic model, we show the following observations.⁶

Observation 1. *In the presence of investment anticipation or delay, **gross cost savings** from a grid expansion will be underestimated around the event window. Furthermore, **net cost benefits** accounting for the investment costs of solar will be*

- *underestimated if expansion is delayed, and*
- *overestimated if expansion is anticipated but its investment costs ignored.*

Visually, it is clear that gross cost savings are largest when the full shaded area is considered.⁷ In the presence of delayed investments, gains from trade realized around the event window are only equal to the static gains, which are by construction smaller. If investment is anticipated, gains from trade only equal the triangle expanding the quantity beyond autarky, but miss the cost savings induced by the solar expansion in the North.

Observation 2. *In the presence of investment anticipation or delay, **price reductions** from a grid expansion will be underestimated around the event window.*

⁴Solar production involves mostly fixed costs. The cost c is intended to capture the strike price at which solar panels are profitable.

⁵We assume that c is such that solar investment is at an interior solution, i.e., $q^{solar} \geq 0$, as implied by $p^N < c < p^*$.

⁶Most of our results should be true under quite general conditions, but our proofs are based on the stylized cost curves in this basic model. We plan to extend the results to clarify if the linearity assumption matters for some of our predictions.

⁷See Appendix for mathematical proofs of all results.

It is easy to see that with investment anticipation, prices before market integration will tend to be lower than without anticipation, due to the depressing effect of solar production. Therefore, price reductions will be less salient if solar investment has already occurred. In the presence of investment delays, the key is to show that price reductions are larger in the dynamic equilibrium than in the static one with no solar investment. This is again due to the depressing effects on prices from solar entry, which only occur in the dynamic case.

Observation 3. *In the presence of investment anticipation or delay, reductions in **regional price differences** (price convergence) will be*

- *overestimated in the presence of anticipation,*
- *correct in the presence of delayed investment as long as prices converge both with and without investment. Otherwise, price convergence will be overestimated.*

Prices in the North are depressed in the presence of anticipation of investments, as shown in Figure 1 when comparing p^N to $\hat{p}^N$. Therefore, the price gap in prices $p^S - \hat{p}^N$ is overstated. If investment is delayed but prices converge, then there is no bias in the case of delayed investments. However, in the presence of transmission line bottlenecks, price convergence will be overstated. As can be seen from Figure 1, there is more trade in the presence of solar investment (e^{**}) than without it (e^*). Therefore, if the price gap does not go to zero, price convergence will be higher when the cost curves between the two regions are more similar (static curves).

In our empirical analysis below, we consider these insights and provide empirical quantification to the theoretical predictions described in this section. In addition, we aim to identify the bias that can be created in a commonly-used event study design and explore how to correct for the under- or overestimation of transmission line benefits using a structural model.

3 Background and Data

In this section, we describe institutional details about the Chilean Electricity Market and data to be used for our empirical analysis.

3.1 Market Integration in the Chilean Electricity Market

In Figure 2, we summarize the recent market integration of the Chilean Electricity Market. Prior to November 2017, the electric power grid in Chile was organized in two main systems—Sistema Interconectado del Norte Grande (SING) in the northern region and Sistema Interconectado Central (SIC) in the central-southern region. There was no inter-connection between these two systems, and each system was dispatched fully separately.

[Figure 2 about here]

In November 2017, these two systems were connected for the first time, with a double circuit 500kV transmission line with a firm capacity of 1500 MW. This interconnection connected the southern part of SING (Antofagasta) and the northern part of SIC (Atacama) to integrate the two systems. The integrated new system—Sistema Eléctrico Nacional (SEN)—consists of over 99% of the installed capacity for the country.⁸

In June 2019, this interconnection was extended by another double circuit 500kV transmission line that connected the northern part of SIC (Atacama) and southern part of SIC (Santiago metropolitan region). In this paper, we use “interconnection” to refer to the interconnection built in 2017 and “reinforcement” to refer to the extension line built in June 2019. As we show in our analysis below, both of interconnection and reinforcement played key roles in integrating the Chilean electricity market.

Long-distance transmission investment involves policy decisions, permit acquisitions, and major construction, all of which can take considerable time. Therefore, it is important to recognize that market players may be able to anticipate new transmission lines long before they are built, which may influence their decisions regarding construction of new power plants. It is thus critically important to factor this anticipation in the analysis of the long-run impacts of such investment.

In the case of the Chilean integration, the 2017 interconnection was anticipated as far as 3 years in advance. Chile passed a modification to the “General Electric Services Law” on February 7 in 2014, which promoted the idea of the interconnection of SING and SIC in the near future. The construction of the interconnection began in August 2015. Our empirical analysis therefore aims to incorporate the potential anticipation impacts on the investment in new power plants.

3.2 Cost-Based Dispatch and Pricing in the Chilean Electricity Market

Similar to other Latin American countries, Chile uses cost-based dispatch to clear demand and supply in its spot market. Power plants submit the technical characteristics of their units as well as natural gas or other input contracts with the input prices to the Load Economic Dispatch Center (CDEC), which is the Independent System Operator (ISO) in Chile. Based on this information, the CDEC computes unit-level start-up cost and variable operating cost everyday and uses these costs, demand, and their network model to determine least-cost dispatch under transmission constraints.

The lowest cost dispatch means that the ISO ranks power plants from those with lower marginal costs to those with higher marginal costs and decide a set of power plants that can meet demand with the overall lowest cost that is possible under transmission constraints. Therefore, the resulting spot market price is equal to the marginal cost of the most expensive unit of generation in use. In the presence of transmission constraints between regions, the spot prices

⁸The remaining 1% is served by two other isolated systems in the south of SIC outside the map in Figure 2.

can differ across regions. The most spatially disaggregated price points are called nodes, and the CDEC publishes the hourly spot prices at the node level.

This cost-based dispatch mechanism is different from bid-based dispatch, which is a common dispatch method in many countries including the United States. In bid-based dispatch, power plants submit their supply bids in an auction market. Their bids do not have to be equal to their marginal costs. In contrast, in cost-based dispatch, plants are required to submit their marginal costs to the system operator who uses this information to clear the market.

Compared to bid-based dispatch, cost-based dispatch has an advantage of reducing the risk of system-wide and local market power, particularly in markets with insufficient transmission capacity (Wolak, 2003). This setting makes our modeling and analysis tractable because market power is less likely to be a large issue than bid-based markets. Note that cost-based dispatch may not fully eliminate the exercises of market power if large firms could manipulate their reported costs or plant maintenance/outage schedules. However, based on our analysis on the reported costs and availability of power plants, we do not find evidence of large firms exercising market power in our sample period.

To hedge spot market risk, generators can also sign long-term contracts with customers.⁹ Customers with installed demand capacity over 500 kW can have bilateral contracts with generators. Other customers are called “regulated customers” because they are served by local distribution companies with regulated retail prices. These customers cannot have direct contract with generators. Instead, the long-term contracts are auctioned in a centralized auction between local distribution companies and generators. Generators with long-term contracts can either generate electricity or purchase it from the spot market. Thus, these long-term contracts are equivalent to financial positions and their price should be reflective of the market price expectations.

3.3 Data and Summary Statistics

A key advantage of studying the Chilean electricity market is that nearly all of the data relevant to market transactions are available. Although many countries including the United States make part of their electricity market data available, Chile is one of the very few countries in which nearly all micro data, including plant-level generation, cost, market dispatch mechanisms, and market clearing prices are available.¹⁰ We use several data sets for our empirical analysis.

Hourly and daily marginal cost at the unit level: As described in the previous section, generators in the Chilean electricity market submit their marginal cost information every day to the system operator. For power plants in SIC regions, we use unit-level costs for three time segments of the day: block 1 (midnight to 8 am), block 2 (8 am to 6 pm), and block 3 (6 pm to midnight). For power plants in SING regions, we use unit-level daily cost data. We use this data from 2017 through 2020.

Hourly demand at the node level: Our data cover 2017 through 2020.

⁹Long-term contracts are optional to generators. They can participate in the spot market without long-term contracts. Bustos-Salvagno (2015) provides detailed description about the long-run contracts in the Chilean electricity market.

¹⁰Another country that makes much of the electricity market data publicly available is Spain (Reguant, 2014; Fabra and Reguant, 2014).

Hourly market clearing prices at the node level: The system operator uses marginal costs, demand, and transmission constraints to clear the market. The hourly market clearing prices are available at the node level. We collect this data from SING, SIC, and SEN for 2008 through 2020.

Hourly electricity generation at the unit level. With the spot market outcomes, the system operator dispatches generation. We use hourly electricity generation at the unit level from 2014 to 2020.

Plant characteristics and investment. This data include plant-level capacity, year built, and investment.

Power purchase agreements. Licitaciones Eléctricas provides a subset of long-term contracts. This data only includes contracts that were auctioned in a centralized auction for regulated customers (customers with 500 kW or less capacity) and does not include bilateral contracts between generators and large customers (customers with 500 kW or more capacity). Contracts specify duration, quantity, and price. Contracts are at the firm level rather than generator level. This makes it challenging to clearly identify the relevant power plants and fuel types for each contract.

The summary statistics in Table 1 show key characteristics of the Chilean electricity market. First, approximately 25% of electricity generation comes from SING (the northern system) and 75% comes from SIC (the southern system). Second, hourly system demand does not vary much across hours as it is suggested by the hourly generation at noon and midnight in the table. This implies that electricity demand in Chile does not have much of peak and off-peak hours, as it is the case in many other electricity markets, including California, DC, Japan, and Spain-Portugal (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002; Wolak, 2011; Ito and Reguant, 2016; Ito, Ida and Tanaka, 2018, 2021). Third, before the introduction of the interconnection, the average node price was higher in SIC than SING at noon, whereas it was higher in SING than SIC at midnight. The post-interconnection average node prices suggest price convergence both at noon and midnight between the SIC and SING regions, which we empirically investigate more in the next section.

[Table 1 about here]

4 Static Analysis of Market Integration

In this section, we use a conventional static event-study analysis to quantify the impacts of transmission expansions in Chile. Given the availability of detailed data on hourly price, cost, electricity generation, and plant entries, we can compute the changes in these variables before and after the two events: the interconnection between SING and SIC, and the reinforcement between Atacama and Santiago. Our theory in Section 2 suggests that this conventional approach may understate the impact of market integration, which we examine in Section 5.

4.1 Impacts of Market Integration on Wholesale Electricity Prices

One of the theoretical predictions in Section 2 is that market integration could result in convergence in wholesale electricity prices between regions. To empirically test this prediction, we show how the price difference between SING (north) and SIC (south) changed over time in Figure 3. For each week, we calculate the weekly average of hourly node prices in SING and SIC respectively, take the difference (SING price minus SIC price), and make time-series figures.

[Figure 3 about here]

Panel A shows the result for the boarder regions—regions within 800 km from the SING-SIC border). Before the interconnection in November 2017, there was large volatility in the price difference. For example, in 2014, the average price was lower in SING by around \$150/MWh. In contrast, it is higher in SING by around \$100/MWh in 2016. Because SING and SIC were fully separated markets at this time, differences in demand or supply in each region could make the price difference between the two markets.

After the interconnection in 2017, the average price difference between SING and SIC diminished to nearly zero in the border regions. This price convergence is consistent with the prediction from the *law of one price*. Electricity is a homogeneous good, and the spot market generates one market clearing price in a market when there is no transmission congestion within the market.

The implications of transmission congestion can be seen in Panel B, where we plot the same figure by including all regions in SING and SIC. The figures suggest that the interconnection in 2017 reduced the average price difference between SING and SIC. However, the complete price convergence for the entire regions did not happen until the reinforcement was opened in June 2019. This result suggests that even after the opening of the interconnection, there was transmission congestion between the northern SIC and the southern SIC regions.

In Figure 4, we examine the spatial heterogeneity in price convergence. We calculate the province-level average node prices and make heat maps for the three time periods: 1) before the interconnection, 2) after the interconnection and before the reinforcement, and 3) after the reinforcement. The heat maps show the average node prices at noon, which tends to be one of the most congested hours in the transmission network in Chile because of solar generation.

[Figure 4 about here]

Prior to the interconnection, there was a steep price difference between SING and SIC at the border. The northern SIC (i.e., around Atacama desert region) had node prices near zero because zero-marginal-cost solar generation depressed the market price toward zero. The heat map suggests that this inexpensive electricity could reach neither SING, due to lack of interconnection, nor the southern SIC (i.e., around Santiago region), due to transmission constraint.

The middle heat map shows the period after the interconnection but before reinforcement. The interconnection made it possible for the low-cost solar power to be transmitted to SING and to some of the central part of SIC, which

lowered the node prices in these areas. In exchange, this increased the node prices in the Atacama region. However, in the southern part of SIC, prices remained high, suggesting that the transmission capacity from the northern SIC to the southern SIC was not sufficient during this period to achieve further price convergence.

The heat map on the right presents the period after the reinforcement. It suggests that the low-cost solar power was being transmitted further to the south, making the prices more homogeneous and lower at the national level, except for the very south end of SIC where some patches of relatively higher price regions remained due to the local-level transmission congestion.

4.2 Impacts of Market Integration on Generation Costs

Our theory in Section 2 predicts that new transmission lines could bring a textbook example of gains from trade. In autarky, the system operator dispatches power plants to minimize generation cost in each region. By contrast, when a new transmission line allows two markets to trade, the system operator can dispatch to minimize total generation cost in the two regions. We therefore predict that the interconnection and reinforcement made lower-cost power plants produce more and higher-cost plants produce less.

In Figure 5, we examine the impact of market integration on electricity generation by fuel type. After the interconnection, thermal generation in SING decreased, while solar power in SING and SIC increased. This is because the interconnection was able to relax transmission constraints for solar power near the border of SING and SIC. As a result, zero-marginal cost solar power could flow into SING, which replaced relatively more expensive coal generation.

[Figure 5 about here]

We observed that the reinforcement increased generation in SING, including generation from solar, coal, and natural gas plants. This is because the reinforcement relaxed the transmission constraint between the Atacama region to the southern SIC regions (near Santiago), which allowed power plants in SING regions to export more to the south. As a result, higher-cost electricity in the southern SIC regions was replaced by less expensive generation from SING.

These findings indicate that the new transmission lines enabled power to be dispatched more efficiently. One way to measure this efficiency gain is to examine how generation cost per MWh changed before and after the grid expansions. However, the observed change in generation cost may not accurately measure the efficiency gain if other changes over time (e.g., changes in input costs) are not properly controlled for.

To address this empirical challenge, we use insights from Cicala (2022) and take advantage of the fact that we can compute the “nationwide merit-order cost.” This nationwide merit-order cost is the least possible dispatch cost per MWh that can be obtained in the absence of trade constraints in the Chilean electricity markets, including both SING and SIC regions, and can be a useful control that takes into account non-linearities in the costs of producing electricity as a function of commodity prices (coal and gas) and hydro availability.

We have data on demand, unit-level capacity, and unit-level generation costs every hour. Based on this information, we can identify which units should be dispatched to meet the demand at the lowest system-level cost, assuming there is no trade constraint. We use c_t^* to denote this nationwide merit-order cost (USD/MWh) at time t and c_t to denote the observed generation cost per MWh at the national level.¹¹

There are two approaches to using c_t^* as a control variable. One approach is to define the out-of-merit cost $c_t - c_t^*$, which shows how much the observed cost deviates from the least possible dispatch cost, and use it as a dependent variable. In this way, we could test how market integration changed the deviation between c_t and c_t^* . Another approach is to use c_t as a dependent variable and c_t^* as a control variable. We find that both approaches produce essentially identical results because empirically the coefficient for c_t^* is close to one in the second approach. This is because c_t and c_t^* generally move in a parallel way (Figure A.1). We show the result of the second approach in this section and include the result of the first approach in the appendix (Table A.4).

We estimate the following equation by the OLS:

$$c_t = \beta_1 I_t + \beta_2 R_t + \gamma X_t + \theta_m + u_t, \quad (1)$$

where I_t equals one after the interconnection (November 21, 2017), R_t equals one after the reinforcement (June 11, 2019), X_t is a vector of control variables that include the nationwide merit-order cost c_t^* , θ_m is the month effects to control for seasonality, and u_t is the error term. We calculate heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors.

Table 2 shows results for hour 12 (solar peak hour) and all hours. A key advantage of this approach is that many time-variant factors, such as the impacts of input prices, can be flexibly controlled by c_t^* . As a result, including additional controls does not change much the coefficients for the interconnection and reinforcement. Column 4 implies that the interconnection and reinforcement reduced the generation cost in hour 12 by 1.72 USD/MWh and by 1.12 USD/MWh, respectively. Similarly, column 8 suggests that the interconnection and reinforcement reduced the generation cost in all hours on average by 0.97 USD/MWh and by 1.07 USD/MWh, respectively.

[Table 2 about here]

Our theory in Section 2 suggests that an important limitation of this static analysis is that it does not incorporate potential dynamic effects. Therefore, the results in Table 2 may understate the cost savings from the grid expansions. For example, if entry of solar plants occurred before the market integration in the form of anticipation, such entry impacts are not properly captured by this static analysis. In Section 5.4, we explore how the results in Table 2 would

¹¹Cicala (2022) calculates the merit-order cost within each power control area, whereas our nationwide merit-order cost is defined as the least dispatch cost at the national level, as opposed to SING only or SIC only. In addition, an alternative control variable is the minimum dispatch cost in the absence of market integration (i.e., the least possible generation cost that can be obtained in the absence of market integration). We use this approach in Table A.5 and find that results are similar to Table 2.

change once we incorporate this dynamic impact using our structural model.

4.3 Impacts of Market Integration on Renewable Expansion

Observations 1, 2, and 3 in our theory section imply that the static before-and-after analysis may not properly capture the full impacts of market integration if the entry of power plants occurs with the anticipation of market integration.¹² This is particularly relevant to electricity grid expansions because the announcement and subsequent construction of transmission lines generally start long ahead of the opening of the lines.

To investigate the importance of this point in our empirical context, we examine the entry of solar plants in Figure 6. The red-connected line shows the cumulative installed capacity for solar plants in the northern SIC region. The green solid line shows the average node price at noon, and the green dashed line shows the average node price at midnight.¹³

[Figure 6 about here]

Before 2014, there were nearly no solar plants in this region, and the node prices were not different between noon and midnight. When more solar plants started to enter this region, the node prices at noon started to decline. When the total solar capacity reached around 500 MW in 2015, the node price at noon reached near zero. This is because zero-marginal cost solar generation depressed spot market prices to zero in the local market, and that low-cost electricity could not move to other regions because of transmission constraint.

The transmission constraint was relaxed when the interconnection was opened in 2017. The figure shows that the interconnection made the price at noon get back to positive levels and shrunk the difference in prices between noon and midnight. Furthermore, the reinforcement further narrowed this price difference. The evolution of capacity investment in solar generation indicates that investors were likely to make the investment decision with the anticipation for the interconnection. Between mid-2015 and mid-2017, the node price had been near zero for solar generation. However, the investment on new solar capacity had a steady increase in this period. This investment decision does not make sense without the anticipation that the new interconnection was going to alleviate transmission congestion and increase local node prices.

There are several reasons as to why the anticipatory investment occurred. First, as we explained in Section 3.1, the relevant law was passed in 2014, and the construction of the interconnection line started in 2015, two years before the interconnection was opened. Therefore, market participants had publicly available information about the upcoming market integration. Second, uncertainty in obtaining permits and competing constructions was likely to be another reason to rush firms into the anticipatory investment. Third, the fixed-price power purchase agreements were likely to make the anticipatory investment financially possible. Many solar plants in Chile were built with long-run fixed-

¹²A static analysis will also produce biased results if entry is delayed. We focus here on anticipation because it appears to be clearly present in our application.

¹³We calculate the weighted average node prices in this figure using plant-level daily solar generation as weight.

price contracts. Because the information about the market integration was publicly available, the long-run contract prices, which were determined by a centralized auction for the regulated market and by bilateral agreements for the unregulated market, were likely to reflect the expected long-run local prices. If this is the case, solar plants were able to receive non-zero prices even during the pre-interconnection period.¹⁴

The findings from Figure 6 suggest that incorporating the dynamic impacts of market integration on solar entries can be important part of the value of the transmission expansion. In addition, the evidence of the anticipatory investment suggests that the commonly-used event-study estimation presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.1 may not properly capture this dynamic impact. In the next section, we describe how we address this question by developing a structural model of power plant entry and market integration.

It is important to note that we focus on solar investment for our dynamic correction, as this seems to be the largest margin of adjustment. However, other power plants could also endogenously respond to solar investment and the transmission expansion. In Figure A.2, we examine the entry and potential exit of thermal plants. We find that entry of thermal plants slowed down around 2014-2015 relative to total generation growth, which is consistent with their expected long-run profitability going down. Measuring thermal plant exits in our data is not as straightforward as entries. In our analysis, we consider plants to be no longer available if they stop submitting daily costs to the system operator to be dispatched.¹⁵ In Panel B of Figure A.2, we present the cumulative “potential” exit of thermal plants. We consider that a unit potentially exited if the unit does no longer offer its capacity to the system operator and do not produce at least for a year. For these units, we use the last time with submitted bids as the time of exit and use unit-level capacity (MW) to show cumulative exit in MW. Although exit appears to be exacerbated after the renewable expansion starts, we observe modest exit of plants, in the order of 344 MW of capacity, relative to the total installed thermal capacity, which was above 15 GW during our main period of study.¹⁶ Interestingly, some exits seem to align quite well with the events. While not in our current counterfactuals, one could bound the impact of these exits by attributing them to the transmission expansion. However, the impacts are expected to be small given the size of the plants.

¹⁴A subset of the power purchase agreements for the regulated customers (i.e., customers with less than 500kW) are publicly available, and we show time-series variation in Figure A.5. In this data, we confirmed that the average contracted price for solar plants in was \$66.09 in the 2015 auction. This suggests that solar plants were indeed able to obtain non-zero prices even before the interconnection. Unfortunately, the publicly-available data include only a small subset of the long-run contracts, and therefore, we mainly use the spot market data for our empirical analysis.

¹⁵In practice, some of those power plants could be potentially brought back to the market, i.e., they could be re-opened after a period of “mothballing.”

¹⁶As an alternative definition of exit, we also attempted to focus on plants that have zero production during long spells of time. However, this is problematic because 1) having long periods of zero production is not uncommon for the very expensive peaker plants, and 2) the plants are still available in our analysis for calculating the nationwide merit order and our counterfactuals, therefore, their capacity *can be used*, even if the plants are irrelevant in practice.

5 Dynamic Analysis of Market Integration

To analyze this long-run effect, we build a structural model of power plant entry. In the model, investors consider investment for a new power plant based on the expected value of long-run profit from the investment. The net present value of investment depends on profit from subsequent years. A key element to the future expected profit is transmission constraints from its local region to other regions.

We build a simple transmission network model for the Chilean electricity market to model the spot market with transmission constraints. The attractiveness of the Chilean market is that its simple geography makes the network model tractable and makes it feasible to conduct counterfactual analysis. We simulate a few counterfactual policies on transmission capacity expansion to examine each policy's impact on capacity investment on renewables, node prices, profits, and consumer surplus.

In counterfactual analysis, we simulate what would have happened if the interconnection was not built between SING and SIC in 2017. We simulate both a static version of this counterfactual, in which solar investment remains at the observed levels, and a dynamic version of this counterfactual that endogenizes the reduction in solar investment in the absence of a grid expansion. This allows us to quantify the static and dynamic benefits of the grid expansion.

5.1 Structural Model

The model is solved in two stages. First, a short-run model is used to clear the market every day. Second, a long-run model is used to solve for the equilibrium entry of solar plants.

Short run operations The first part is the system operator's cost minimization problem under the transmission network constraints. We solve it for every day separately.¹⁷ Given available power plant capacity, demand, and transmission network constraints, the system operator minimizes generation costs. As a result of the optimization, the production decisions of each plant and local market prices will be determined.

Mathematically, we solve the constrained optimization problem,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Min}_{q_{it} \geq 0} \quad & C_t = \sum_z \sum_{i \in I_z} c_{it} q_{it}, \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{i \in I_z} q_{it} + \text{imp}_{zt} + \text{exp}_{zt} \geq D_{zt}, \quad q_{it} \leq k_i, \quad f_{lt} \leq F_l. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

C_t is the total system-wise generation cost at time $t \in T$, c_{it} is the marginal cost of generation for plant $i \in I$ at time t , q_{it} is the dispatched quantify, imp_{zt} are imports into zone z , exp_{zt} are exports out of zone z , D_{zt} is the total demand in

¹⁷In practice, the Chilean operator takes into account weekly and seasonal dynamics using a longer horizon. We abstract away from these dynamics and instead include hydro power constraints to reflect water use over the seasons. We also have run a weekly and a monthly model, to allow for water to be allocated more flexibly, obtaining similar quantitative results about the value of the transmission expansion.

zone z , and k_i is the plant's capacity of generation. The model will have $l = 1, \dots, L$ inter-regional transmission lines with net flow transmission capacity F_l . The full set of equations characterizing imp_{zt} , exp_{zt} , and f_{lt} as a function of the vector of quantities q_{it} are presented in Appendix B.

This market operator's problem is the cost minimization problem with three constraints: (1) the sum of dispatched quantities plus any imports or exports needs to be larger than or equal to the aggregate demand in each zone, (2) each plant's dispatched quantity has to be less than or equal to its generation capacity, and (3) the net flow in each inter-regional transmission line (f_l) needs to be less than or equal to its transmission capacity. This market clearing process will produce dispatch quantity for each plant and market clearing prices at each node (p_{it}), which is defined by the shadow value on the demand constraint of each zone z .¹⁸

Our short-run model is admittedly parsimonious. We initially had envisioned using the same mathematical program that the system operator uses on a daily basis, which would fully replicate market clearing under the status quo. However, we decided to build a simple model instead due to several challenges. First, the program used by the system operator has thousands of variables and millions of lines, making it computationally very intensive when thinking about counterfactual entry. Second, it is not trivial to understand how to modify the network properly to simulate conditions before and after the reinforcement, as many thousands of lines are modified at the event. Finally, and quite importantly, we do not observe the model for both SING and SIC before they get interconnected. One possibility would be to improve the model by incorporating some additional constraints such as startup costs, which would be relatively straightforward given that this is a central planner problem, at the cost of some added computational complexity (e.g., see Reguant (2014)). We could additionally consider modeling water more explicitly, as in the Leelo model (Haas et al., 2018).

Long run investment The second part of the model is an investor's decision regarding investment in new renewable plants. With this market clearing process in equation (2) in mind, renewable investors will expand investment in new renewable plants until the following zero-profit condition is satisfied:

$$E \left[\sum_{t \in T} \frac{\sum_h p_{ih}(k_i) \times q_{ih}(k_i)}{(1+r)^t} \right] = \rho k_i, \quad (3)$$

where t indexes a year, h indexes an hour, r is the discount rate, p_{it} is the market clearing price from the solution of equation (2), and ρ is the investment cost per unit of capacity. Due to the direct cannibalization effect of solar power on market prices, the right hand side of the equation is a declining function of capacity k_i . In principle, we would need to solve for investment specific to each area z . However, given the geography of Chile, we focus on solving for optimal

¹⁸In addition to these fundamental constraints, we incorporate operational constraints that are tailored to better describe the Chilean context. For example, we include minimum and maximum hydro power constraints for each zone and minimum production requirements for a baseload plant that is always operating during our sample period. These model details are presented in Appendix B.

investment in cluster 2, which is the one with most relevant utility-scale solar investment and a higher presence of zero prices in the absence of transmission expansion.

To solve the investment problem, we compute the outcomes of the short-run model under alternative network configurations and levels of solar investment. We then search for the level of investment that satisfies the zero profit condition (3).

5.2 Calibration of the Structural Model

Many of the elements in the model are observed in the data, e.g., production costs, demand levels, hydro availability, transmission grid, etc. However, given that our model is stylized, we take several steps to calibrate it. Here we provide an overview, while further details are provided in Appendix B.

Network model To simplify the topography of the network in the Chilean electricity market, we separate the market into five clusters. Any plant in SING belongs to one cluster, as it is a physically isolated entity during the first part of the sample. We assign the provinces in the south of the Maule region to a second cluster. To split the other provinces, where the network is more complex, into three additional clusters. We use a k-means clustering algorithm based on the time series of average province nodal prices, in the spirit of [Mercadal \(2021\)](#).¹⁹

To calibrate the amount of transmission capacity between these different clusters, we calculate trade flows between our clusters in our data. Based on these trade flows, we set the available capacity to the 95th percentile.²⁰ We find that this approach captures well the expansion in transmission capacity during our sample period. While there is a bit of noise in this approach, Table A.1 shows that this procedure captures the expansion process well. From Period 1 to Period 2, Line 1 connecting the North with the rest of the system gets most significantly expanded by about 600 MW (Interconnection). From Period 2 to Period 3, lines 2 and 3 are expanded by about 1,100 MW (Reinforcement).

The five zones appear to do well at describing the main bottlenecks in the system and the geographical split and transmission capacity appears to be consistent with more detailed engineering models of the Chilean electricity market ([Haas et al., 2018](#)), which features four zones.

Supply curves To model thermal generation and hydro availability, we use supply curves that are estimated based on the hourly plant-level data. For coal, diesel, and other traditional generators, we keep the plant as the unit of observation, and set their marginal costs equal to the bids observed in the data. For SING, we use daily cost. For SIC, we use block cost.

¹⁹Our algorithm is simpler than [Mercadal \(2021\)](#), as we do not add an outer loop to discipline the k-means clustering algorithm. Given the topology of the Chilean electricity market, we find that five zones capture well the geographical transmission patterns, at the expense of losing detail about more localized congestion.

²⁰We do not use the maximum flow because our clusters do not reflect the exact network configuration, and the maximum flow constructed with our cluster tends to be an outlier.

Marginal costs for natural gas combined cycle generators are unfortunately harder to define as the marginal cost depends on the type of long-term contract that is being used, but our data do not specify how much quantity is available under each contract-type.²¹ Instead, for natural gas generators, we estimate an hourly cluster-level supply curve based on nodal prices and observed natural gas production. We also include limits to hourly generation set to the minimum and maximum observed generation at each month of sample.

Hydro production is very dependent on expectations of future availability of water, which the Chilean central operator estimates using medium- and long-term forecasting models. Because our model is much more limited, we estimate supply curves based on hydro production and nodal prices at the cluster level, as with natural gas. We regress the observed equilibrium quantities of hydro on equilibrium prices and estimate a month-of-sample supply curve. Additionally, we constrain the amount of water to be used over a given time frame to be equal to the observed water daily use, to reflect the nature of limits to hydro availability.²² We also include minimum and maximum hydro limits to reflect flow regulations and capacity constraints based on the minimum and maximum observed generation at each month of sample.

Solar potential While our data are very detailed in terms of solar output, we lack data on solar *curtailment*. Solar curtailment is important in our application given the presence of zero prices in the Atacama region before the transmission expansion took place. We take advantage of the extremely predictable solar potential in the Atacama region to estimate solar potential at any given point in time.²³ We estimate capacity factors by month and hour of day based on the data after reinforcement occurred. We use price data at the unit-by-hour level to identify when curtailment occurred by taking advantage the fact that curtailment makes price equal to zero. We use these capacity factors times the installed capacity to back out potential solar output.

Investment costs Additionally, we need to calibrate the investment equation (3) of the long run model, which is not observed in the data. There are two parameters that are potentially unobserved, the cost of solar investment (ρ) and the annual interest rate (r). We use $r = 0.0583$ based on (Moore et al., 2020).²⁴ We then estimate ρ by imposing that the observed solar level investment is consistent with a zero profit condition based on average profitability during periods 2 and 3 in the sample is satisfied at the observed level of investment and with an expanded grid. Using this methodology, we estimate the cost of solar to be around 1.5 million per MW installed.

²¹Differences in prices by contract-type can be very large, as some contracts have a zero marginal cost due to their take-or-pay nature.

²²We also have solved the model with weekly and monthly water use, allowing more reshuffling of hydro resources. Our overall results remain similar although monthly reshuffling significantly lowers price volatility, counter to our observed data.

²³Solar potential and availability is very homogeneous in the Atacama desert due to its climatic conditions, (lack of) geographical features, and lack of cloud cover throughout most of the year.

²⁴This number is nearly identical to 0.06, which is the discount rate used by the Chilean government for their public investment projects.

5.2.1 Goodness of fit

While the final model is a stylized representation of the Chilean electricity market that abstracts away from many aspects of electricity market operations, Figure 7 shows that it can do a good job at capturing the evolution of prices in the data. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows that we also match well the production attributed to each generation source across the three periods of study, although natural gas generation is somewhat underestimated in favor of other generators. Our baseline model successfully captures an increase in the production of renewable generation when transmission gets expanded, and matches well the observed percentage increases in the data.

[Figure 7 about here]

By construction, as an empirical strategy for our calibration, our long run investment model is consistent with the data. However, our model is not a careful representation of the investors' expectations and application process to build solar in this market, which is beyond the scope of our model. Even with such a stylized model, our estimated cost per MW installed are on a similar order of magnitude as reported solar panel installation costs. More concretely, we use data on reported completion dates and costs for large-scale solar installations from a quarterly survey run by CLAPES UC-CBC.²⁵ For a total of 107 completed projects, average costs are around 1.95 million dollars per MW.²⁶

5.3 Simulating the Benefits from Transmission

We use this structural model to compute three main scenarios during the period after the interconnection. First, we solve for the equilibrium under the observed expanded grid and solar investment, and we call it *Actual scenario*. Second, we compute a counterfactual policy simulation by simulating what would have happened if the interconnection and reinforcement lines had not been built between SING and SIC in 2017. This can be done by changing the values of F_l in the model, and we call this scenario *No market integration*. The third scenario is equivalent to the second scenario, but we incorporate the dynamic impact on power plant entry—some entry would not happen in the absence of market integration because such investment would become unprofitable. We call it *No market integration (dynamic)*. The node prices at noon in the northern SIC region (Atacama region) before the interconnection suggest that most of the solar capacity investment did not make sense in the absence of the interconnection because firms would not have gained profit from wholesale prices near zero (Figure 6).

To compute the dynamic scenario, we use our structural model to compute the amount of solar capacity investment (as a percentage) that would not have occurred in the absence of market integration. We define the entry threshold as a percentage of the total because solar production in the Atacama desert is very homogeneous, and therefore the exact location of the solar panels is not as relevant as in other applications (e.g., more heterogeneous areas or wind power).

²⁵See <https://www.cbc.cl/ppicbc/>

²⁶Our lower estimated costs could be in part driven by the unusually low fossil fuel prices during the end of our sample, which reduced the profitability of solar panels significantly.

As we reduce the entry of solar plants in the model, the node price in Atacama region (solar-intensive region) increases from zero to positive levels.

We compute how much solar plant entry have to be excluded to make the solar investment profitable in the absence of market integration. We show the result in Appendix table A.3. In the absence of market integration, 75% of the solar plant capacity investment would not have occurred based on the assumption that investors need to have the net present value of their investments become positive in 25 years. Thus, our third scenario is the market equilibrium with no market integration and a 75% reduction of the solar plant capacity relative to the static equilibrium level.

These counterfactuals allow us to compute both the static and dynamic impacts of the transmission line, so that we can decompose the overall impact of the line between static and dynamic effects. This analysis provides insight on the potential biases of using the static model alone.

In Figure 8, we show the equilibrium prices at noon in Atacama region for the three scenarios. The actual scenario shows the same pattern as it is observed in the data in Figure 6. The price was often zero before the interconnection in 2017 because some of solar production could not be exported to other regions. After the interconnection, the price in actual scenario increased to around 50 USD/MWh as this region was able to export solar power to other regions. In contrast, the price would not increase much in the absence of market integration because of the inability of exporting solar power. This is certainly not a realistic equilibrium in a dynamic sense because solar power would be unprofitable investment. With the dynamic consideration (i.e. 75% less solar capacity), the price in this region can be high enough to keep the solar investment profitable.

[Figure 8 about here]

Figure 9 presents solar generation (GWh/day) for the three scenarios. The difference between the static counterfactual and the actual scenario shows how much solar power cannot be produced without market integration because of inability of exporting solar power. The solar generation in the dynamic scenario suggests that ignoring the dynamic impact would understate the impact of market integration on renewable expansion.

[Figure 9 about here]

Similarly, Figure 10 indicates that generation costs are highest in the absence of solar investment and market integration, which implies that ignoring the dynamic impact understates the benefits of market integration. This is consistent with a theoretical prediction (Observation 1) in Section 2.

[Figure 10 about here]

In Table 3, we provide a summarized comparison between these three sets of counterfactuals and test some of the theoretical predictions described in Section 2. Without market integration, solar generation would be less than the

actual scenario by 17% in the static case and 51% if we incorporate the dynamic impact on solar plant entry. In line with Observation 1, in the presence of anticipated solar investments, the static approach understates the reduction in generation costs. The static approach predicts a reduction in generation costs of 4% (9% at noon, an hour with high solar generation). However, the dynamic gross benefits are 5% (12% at noon). The results from that observation also suggest that 4% is an upper bound on the *net* benefits of investment (accounting for solar investment costs).

[Table 3 about here]

The system-level prices suggest that market integration can successfully reduce prices. However, this is not true for all regions, with Atacama having much lower prices in the absence of market integration. This is consistent with Observation 2 in Section 2. Furthermore, the results on the prices in Atacama (a solar-intensive region in the north) and Santiago (a demand center in the central-south) are consistent with Observation 3. If we do not incorporate the dynamic effect, the price in Atacama would be predicted to be very low in the absence of market integration (1.58 USD/MWh in column 2). This is because the static approach ignores the fact that some solar entry would be unprofitable without market integration. As a result, the impacts of market integration on price convergence between these two regions are overstated in the static result in column 2 compared to the dynamic result in column 3, as suggested by Observation 3.²⁷

5.4 Estimating a Corrected Event Study

Our theory in Section 2 and empirical findings in sections 5.3 suggest that the conventional event study estimation is likely to underestimate the cost savings from market integration because it does not take into account for potential dynamic effects. In this subsection, we explore how to correct for such dynamic bias in the event-study framework.

The challenge in the event study approach is that it cannot correctly capture investment effects if investment occurs in anticipation of the events. How can we address this problem? Our idea is based on the following thought experiment: What would happen to our regression estimates if investment were coincidental to the transmission expansion, as opposed to anticipated?

To implement dynamic correction for event-study estimation, we take two steps. First, we use our structural model to compute how much of the observed solar investments would have been unprofitable in counterfactual scenarios as we did in Section 5.3. We compute thresholds for both a scenario with only the interconnection, and one with no expansion at all. We find that in the absence of interconnection and reinforcement, 75% of the observed solar would have been unprofitable. If the interconnection was built but the reinforcement was not built, 30% of the observed solar would have been unprofitable. This implies that without anticipatory investments, we would have 25% of the observed

²⁷Note that Observation 3 is derived under the assumption that there is full price convergence. As shown by the column under the actual scenario, convergence is not complete.

solar in the pre-interconnection period, 70% of the observed solar in the period after the interconnection and before the reinforcement, and 100% of the observed solar after the reinforcement. The structural model also provides us the market equilibrium production quantities, prices, and costs with the dynamic correction.

Second, we use these three scenarios (100%, 70%, and 25% of solar investment) to construct a simulated time series in which investment changes occur at the same time at the event. We use the time series with only 25% of solar investment for the period before the interconnection, we use the time series with 70% of solar investment for the interim period, and we set investment to 100% when the reinforcement occurs. We use the equilibrium outcomes from this new time series, corrected by changes in investment, to estimate the event-study regression in equation (1). This implies that our time series, by construction, has structural investment breaks right at the moment in which our two event studies occur.

In Table 4, we present the event-study regressions with and without dynamic correction. To make the comparison easier, we present only the coefficients on the interconnection and reinforcement dummy variables in this table and include the full regression results in Table A.6. We use the first three columns to present results for hour 12 and the last three columns to show results for all hours.

[Table 4 about here]

In Column 1 and 4, we estimate the conventional event-study regression without dynamic correction. Because the anticipatory investment in solar plants occurred well before the events, this method underestimates the benefit of transmission expansions. Column 1 indicates that costs are reduced by 1.32 and 0.61 \$/MWh thanks to the interconnection and reinforcement, respectively. In column 2, we estimate the event study regression with dynamic correction and find that the cost savings from the interconnection and reinforcement are 2.62 and 1.89 \$/MWh. Comparison between columns 1 and 2 and between columns 4 and 5 suggests that accounting for the dynamic benefits of the lines substantially increases the estimates of cost reductions. This highlights some of the added benefits that might be underestimated by a more naïve event-study design.

Note that in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, we use our structural model to compute the market equilibrium, create time-series data based on this result, and estimate the event study regression in equation (1). We take this approach on purpose to compare how the standard event study results differ from the event study results with our dynamic correction. However, perhaps a more obvious way of using the structural model is to do counterfactual simulations to estimate the impact of interconnection and reinforcement separately. We can use the post-period data from each counterfactual directly and estimate the difference between a scenario with solar investment at 25% and no transmission expansion (25% investment and no market integration) and a counterfactual scenario with corrected investments for the interconnection event (70% investment and interconnection present) and the reinforcement event (100% of investment and full transmission expansion). The advantage of this approach is that we perfectly control for confounding

factors, and we can just difference out the two time series to get at the effects. We compare costs from the 25% case to the 70% case between November 2017 and June 2019 to get at the effects of the interconnection, and from the 70% case to the 100% case starting in June 2019 to get at the additional effects of the reinforcement.

In columns 3 and 6, we present results from counterfactual simulations to compare them with results from the event-study estimation. To estimate the impact of the interconnection by counterfactual simulation, we use data after the interconnection (but before the reinforcement) and estimate the difference between the actual scenario and counterfactual scenario with no interconnection. Similarly, to estimate the impact of the reinforcement, we use data after the reinforcement and estimate the difference between the actual scenario and counterfactual scenario without reinforcement (but with interconnection). Comparison between columns 2 and 3, and comparison between columns 5 and 6 suggest that once we make dynamic correction, the event study estimation, which identifies the event impacts based on before-and-after data, and the simulation approach, which identifies the event impacts based on the post event data with counterfactual simulations, produce numerically similar results.

6 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Transmission Investments

According to the Chilean government, the costs of the interconnection and the reinforcement lines were \$860 million and \$1,000 million (Raby, 2016; Isa-Interchile, 2022). These transmission expansions initially presented doubts regarding its economic benefits. For example, *Diario Financiero* (2013) describes that consumers at first considered that the costs may exceed the benefits that could be brought by a unified market. The discussion of the benefits to consumers is important, as these line expansions were paid via an increase in energy fees by consumers.²⁸

In this section, we investigate if the costs of transmission investments can be justified by its long-run benefit for consumers.²⁹ To calculate the impact of market integration on consumer surplus, we calculate a scenario with no market integration with limited solar investment (25%)—this is because 75% of the solar would be unprofitable in this scenario as we described in the previous section—and compare it to a scenario with full market integration and full solar investment (100%) during our period of study. For each date, hour, and cluster, we obtain the market equilibrium prices for two scenarios—“full integration scenario” (i.e., the scenario with the interconnection and reinforcement) and “no market integration scenario.” We also consider a scenario with no market integration with full solar investment (i.e., we do not make dynamic correction for solar investment). This allows us to compute the benefits of the transmission expansion when the dynamic impacts are ignored.

We obtain the change in consumer surplus by multiplying electricity demand with the difference in the prices be-

²⁸In 2015, the government of Chile held a public auction for the construction of the transmission line. In this auction, the objective was to minimize the cost of construction that is paid by consumers in the tariff associated with electric transmission.

²⁹We consider a cost-benefit of the interconnection and reinforcement together in this section. We provide a cost-benefit of the interconnection by itself in Figure A.3 in the appendix.

tween full integration scenario and no market integration (“with dynamic correction”) and one without the investment correction (“without dynamic correction”). Finally, we calculate the net present value of this consumer surplus with a range of assumptions on the discount rate. We then find the number of years necessary for the net present value of consumer surplus to equal the cost of the line.

In Figure 11, we use a wide range of discount rates to show how long it takes to recover the costs of the transmission investments. The first line (“without dynamic correction”) shows the result in which we do not incorporate the dynamic impact on solar investment, whereas the second line (“with dynamic correction”) incorporates the dynamic impact. These two lines indicate that ignoring the dynamic impact substantially understates the benefit of the transmission investments. The findings also suggest that the line was a net benefit to consumers. With the discount rate at 5.83% (Moore et al., 2020), the costs of the line were recovered by consumers in about 27 years (without dynamic correction) and less than 8 years (with dynamic correction).

[Figure 11 about here]

An additional benefit of market integration in our context is the reduction in negative environmental externality (Fell, Kaffine and Novan, 2021). The market integration increased renewable generation, which might have replaced some thermal generation. This implies that the market integration might have reduced both of the global pollutants such as CO₂ and the local pollutants such as SO₂ and NO_x. Our counterfactual simulations allow us to quantify the difference in electricity production at the unit-by-hour level between “actual scenario” and “no market integration scenario” (see Table A.8). We use this information to calculate the reduction in electricity production from each type of thermal plants such as coal and natural gas. We combine this information with the estimates of the negative externality (USD/MWh) by power plant types in Greenstone and Looney (2012) and Carleton and Greenstone (2021).³⁰ The third line in Figure 11 suggests that with this environmental benefit, the costs of interconnection and reinforcement can be recovered in less than 5.5 years for any of the discount rates considered.

Our main analysis focuses on consumer surplus and does not explicitly include producer surplus for a couple of reasons. First, in Chile and many countries, the cost of transmission investments are eventually paid by consumers. Therefore, the most policy-relevant question is often whether the costs of transmission investments can be justified by the long-run benefits to consumers. Second, because Chile uses cost-based dispatch with frequently audited costs, it is reasonable to consider that the long-run producer surplus, which includes upfront construction costs and competitive rents, should be near zero at least theoretically. Nevertheless, it is still helpful to consider an approach that attempts to include producer surplus in the calculation. In the appendix Figure A.4, we include producer surplus based on a few assumptions. We assume that total production costs are a sufficient statistic for static overall welfare gains. We take into account the capital costs of building solar plants as an additional cost and assume that capital and fixed costs of

³⁰Greenstone and Looney (2012) estimate that the non-carbon external cost is 3.4 cents per kWh for coal generation and 0.2 cents per kWh for natural gas generation.

non-solar plants do not change across counterfactuals. Figure A.4 suggests that taking into account producer surplus in this way extends the needed time to recover the cost of the line and makes it more sensitive to the discount factor, going from 15 years (2% discount rate) to 24 years (5.83% discount rate).

It is important to note that our calculation is likely to understate the benefits of market integration at least for three reasons. First, coal and natural gas prices were lower than the historical average in our sample period. As these fuel prices come back to historical averages in the future, the benefit of renewables would be larger than our calculation. Second, our calculation includes the entries of solar plants only up to the end of our sample period and does not include additional entries of solar plants in subsequent years. Because these additional entries were unlikely to occur in the absence of market integration, this is another reason why our benefit calculation can be underestimated. Finally, prior to the renewable expansion, Chile has been relying on imports of natural gas and coal to generate large amounts of electricity, and it has been an energy security problem. Therefore, renewable expansion provided a benefit of energy security for the country, which is not incorporated in our calculation.


7 Conclusions

We present a simple theoretical model that emphasizes why market integration plays a key role in renewable expansion in static and dynamic ways. Statically, market integration improves allocative efficiency by gains from trade. Dynamically, it provides incentives for new entry of renewable plants. We highlight how a traditional event study methodology could miss the full dynamic impact. To quantify these theoretical predictions, we build a structural model of solar investment and apply it to the Chilean electricity market, which underwent a recent increase in market integration—two fully separated markets were integrated into one market in 2017 and further reinforced in 2019.

Empirically, we find that market integration resulted in price convergence across regions, increases in renewable generation, and decreases in overall generation cost due to gains from trade. Furthermore, our counterfactual simulations quantify that a substantial amount of renewable entry would not have occurred in the absence of market integration. We show that ignoring this dynamic effect using an event study methodology would significantly understate the benefits of market integration, including its impacts on allocative efficiency and renewable energy expansion.


Figures

Figure 1: Static and Dynamic Impacts of Market Integration



Note: This figure summarizes theoretical predictions described in Section 2. The static case considers the impact of market integration, assuming that it does not affect entries of solar plants, whereas the dynamic case takes into account for the impact on solar investment. In the static case, the market integration moves the equilibrium to e^* , resulting in the static gains from trade equal to the triangle area e^S , e^N , and e^* . In the dynamic case, the market integration also induces entries of solar plants that have zero marginal cost. As a result, it shifts the cost curve in the North to the right. This equilibrium (e^{**}) generates an additional cost savings from the impact of market integration on the entries of solar plants. We also show that when solar entries occur in the anticipation of market integration, a commonly used event study design captures only a partial impact (the triangle area e^S , $\hat{e}^N$, and e^{**}) rather than the full impact of market integration.


Figure 2: Market Integration in the Chilean Electricity Markets




Note: The two largest electricity markets in Chile (SING and SIC) were fully disconnected until the interconnection was built between Antofagasta and Atacama in November 2017. The reinforcement line was built between Atacama and Santiago in June 2019.

Figure 3: Impacts of Market Integration on the Price Difference Between SING (North) and SIC (South)

Panel A: Border regions (within 800 km from the SING-SIC border)




Panel B: All regions




Note: This figure examines the impacts of market integration on the difference in wholesale electricity prices between SING and SIC. Each dot is the difference between the weekly average of hourly node prices in SING and the weekly average of hourly node prices in SIC (i.e., SING minus SIC), weighted by electricity generation in each node.

Figure 4: Impacts of Market Integration on Spatial Variation in Electricity Prices




Note: These heat maps examine spatial heterogeneity in wholesale electricity prices. We calculate the province-level average node prices and make heat maps for the three time periods: 1) before the interconnection, 2) after the interconnection but before the reinforcement, and 3) after the reinforcement. We use the percentiles of the node price distribution to define color categories as shown in the legend. The maps also include names of regions, major cities, and the locations of the interconnection and reinforcement transmission lines.

Figure 5: Impacts of Market Integration on Electricity Generation by Fuel Type




Note: This figure shows the average daily generation (MWh) by fuel type over the calendar months.

Figure 6: Impacts of Market Integration on Solar Expansion




Note: This figure shows the cumulative installed capacity of solar plants, average hourly generation for each month, and node prices for these plants at noon and midnight. We calculate the weighted average node prices in this figure using plant-level daily solar generation as weight. As more solar entries started around 2014-15, the node price at noon began to decline and reached near zero around 2016. Despite the near-zero market price, solar entries continued, which suggests that these investment was considered to be profitable in the long run with the anticipation of market integration in 2017 and 2019, which was publicly announced in 2015.

Figure 7: Model Fit: Model-Predicted Market Price and Actual Market Price in the Data




Note: This figure compares the price predicted by the structural model described in Section 5 and actual prices in the data. Each dot represents the weekly average of hourly node prices from all nodes, weighted by the generation at the node level.

Figure 8: Counterfactual Simulation Results: Prices in Atacama (Renewable-Intensive Region)




Note: We use the structural model and counterfactual simulations described in Section 5.3 to compute market equilibria for three scenarios. The first scenario is the actual scenario in which market integration happened (the interconnection in November 2017 and the reinforcement in June 2019). The second scenario is a counterfactual case in which the market integration did not happen. The third scenario is equivalent to the second scenario, but we incorporate the dynamic impact on power plant entry—some entry would not happen in the absence of market integration because such investment would become unprofitable. This figure presents the wholesale electricity prices (USD/MWh) for these three scenarios.

Figure 9: Counterfactual Simulation Results: Solar Generation




Note: We use the structural model and counterfactual simulations described in Section 5.3 to compute market equilibria for three scenarios. The first scenario is the actual scenario in which market integration happened (the interconnection in November 2017 and the reinforcement in June 2019). The second scenario is a counterfactual case in which the market integration did not happen. The third scenario is equivalent to the second scenario, but we incorporate the dynamic impact on power plant entry—some entry would not happen in the absence of market integration because such investment would become unprofitable. This figure presents total electricity generation from solar plants (GWh/day) for these three scenarios. Each dot represents the weekly average of solar generation per day in GWh.

Figure 10: Counterfactual Simulation Results: Electricity Generation Cost (USD/MWh)



Note: We use the structural model and counterfactual simulations described in Section 5.3 to compute market equilibria for three scenarios. The first scenario is the actual scenario in which market integration happened (the interconnection in November 2017 and the reinforcement in June 2019). The second scenario is a counterfactual case in which the market integration did not happen. The third scenario is equivalent to the second scenario, but we incorporate the dynamic impact on power plant entry—some entry would not happen in the absence of market integration because such investment would become unprofitable. This figure presents electricity generation cost (USD/MWh) for these three scenarios. Each dot represents the weekly average of generation cost at noon (hour 12) per MWh in USD.

Figure 11: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investments in the Transmission Lines



Note: This figure shows how long it takes to recover the cost of transmission investment based on the net present value of the benefit of market integration. The dashed vertical line (0.0583) shows the discount rate estimated for Chile in [Moore et al. \(2020\)](#).

Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Pre-Interconnection (Nov. 2016 - Nov. 2017)		Post-Interconnection (Nov. 2017 - Dec. 2019)
	SIC	SING	SEN
Hourly total generation at noon (MWh)	6843 (680)	2143 (188)	9341 (685)
Hourly total generation at midnight (MWh)	6284 (349)	2260 (198)	8879 (393)
Node price at noon (USD/MWh)	57.73 (36.79)	46.22 (21.14)	50.16 (25.53)
Node price at midnight (USD/MWh)	59.33 (29.50)	76.49 (42.40)	55.76 (25.04)
Variable cost: Thermal (USD/MWh)	44.37 (15.55)	44.32 (12.80)	43.70 (15.17)
Installed capacity (MW):			
Thermal	8168	4227	12775
Hydro	6649	16	6734
Solar	1384	654	2642
Wind	1204	201	2115

Note: This table shows the summary statistics of our data.

Table 2: Static Event Study Analysis of the Impact of Market Integration

Dependent Variable: Generation Cost (USD/MWh)								
	Hour 12				All hours			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1(After the interconnection)	-1.50 (0.18)	-1.70 (0.22)	-1.71 (0.22)	-1.72 (0.22)	-1.05 (0.15)	-1.07 (0.17)	-1.07 (0.17)	-0.97 (0.17)
1(After the reinforcement)	-1.69 (0.16)	-0.83 (0.45)	-0.91 (0.47)	-1.12 (0.49)	-1.37 (0.13)	-0.87 (0.35)	-0.87 (0.36)	-1.07 (0.38)
Nationwide merit-order cost	1.06 (0.01)	1.02 (0.02)	1.02 (0.02)	1.02 (0.02)	1.02 (0.01)	0.98 (0.01)	0.98 (0.02)	0.99 (0.02)
Coal price [USD/ton]		0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Natural gas price [USD/m ³]			-4.47 (3.56)	-4.59 (3.63)			0.20 (2.62)	0.51 (2.69)
Hydro availability				-0.27 (0.12)				-0.43 (0.11)
Scheduled demand (GWh)				0.17 (0.10)				0.04 (0.09)
Mean of dependent variable	36.12	36.12	36.12	36.12	38.87	38.87	38.87	38.87
Month FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample size	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041
R ²	0.93	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.94	0.97	0.97	0.97

Note: This table shows the results of the regression described in equation (1). The dependent variable is the observed hourly generation cost per MWh. We report heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3: Counterfactual Simulation Results: Impacts of Market Integration with Dynamic Correction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Actual	No market integration		Impacts of integration	
	Market integration	Without dynamic correction	With dynamic correction	(1)-(2) Without correction	(1)-(3) With correction
Solar generation (GWh/day)	19.37	16.60	12.80	2.77 (+17%)	6.57 (+51%)
Generation cost (USD/MWh): all hours	26.43	27.45	27.91	-1.02 (-4%)	-1.48 (-5%)
Generation cost (USD/MWh): hour 12	23.11	25.28	26.40	-2.17 (-9%)	-3.29 (-12%)
Daily price in all regions (USD/MWh)	36.35	38.18	38.89	-1.83 (-5%)	-2.54 (-7%)
Price at noon in all regions (USD/MWh)	35.48	37.33	39.19	-1.84 (-5%)	-3.71 (-9%)
Price at noon in Atacama (USD/MWh)	33.90	1.58	28.81	32.32 (+2,040%)	5.09 (+18%)
Price at noon in Santiago (USD/MWh)	36.68	43.58	43.59	-6.89 (-16%)	-6.91 (-16%)
Price difference (Santiago - Atacama)	2.78	41.99	14.78	-39.21 (-93%)	-12.00 (-81%)

Note: This table shows the counterfactual simulation results in Section 5.3. Column (2) shows the market equilibrium before the expansion of the grid. Column (3) shows the market equilibrium before the expansion of the grid and assumes that solar investment expansion has not been realized (only 25% of solar investment is present).

Table 4: Dynamic Correction for the Event Study Analysis

	Hour 12			All hours		
	Event study analysis		Counterfactual simulation	Event study analysis		Counterfactual simulation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dynamic correction:	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
1(After the interconnection)	-1.32 (0.07)	-2.62 (0.08)	-2.36	-0.60 (0.03)	-1.18 (0.04)	-1.05
1(After the reinforcement)	-0.61 (0.13)	-1.89 (0.16)	-1.58	-0.25 (0.07)	-0.72 (0.08)	-0.64

Note: This table summarizes results from Table A.6 (event study analysis with and without dynamic correction) and Table A.7 (counterfactual simulation with dynamic correction). Columns 1 and 4 show the estimates from the event study analysis without dynamic correction. In columns 2 and 5, we shift the timing of solar investment so that it occurs right after the interconnection and reinforcement (i.e., correct for anticipatory investment effects), use our structural model to obtain market outcomes, and re-run the event study analysis. In columns 3 and 6, we compare the results of the event study analysis with dynamic correction to the results from counterfactual simulation with dynamic correction.

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Online Appendix (Not for Publication)

A Proofs

Proof Observation 1

Proof. First we need to show that gross gains from trade are largest in the full dynamic comparison.

- If investment effects are ignored, we need to show that total gross costs are larger in the absence of solar investment, which is trivially satisfied. For any positive q^{solar} , total gross costs go down. Numerically,

$$GainsTrade - GainsTrade_{noinvest} = \frac{\beta^N \beta^S}{2(\beta^N + \beta^S)} q^{solar} (2D - q^{solar}) > 0,$$

for relevant well-defined solution, as $q^{solar} < D$.

- If investment has already realized, then the distortion comes in the “before” period. We need to show that autarky costs are smaller with anticipated investment, which is also trivial in a general setting as, for any positive q^{solar} , total gross costs go down. Numerically,

$$GainsTrade - GainsTrade_{investearly} = \beta^N q^{solar} (D^N - \frac{q^{solar}}{2}) > 0,$$

which is well defined for $q^{solar} \leq D^N$. If $q^{solar} > D^N$, then it is also true as the difference in gains from trade becomes simply $(\beta^N D^{N2})/2$, the costs of producing under autarky in the North.

The second part is a bit more subtle but also follows from very general economic principles, as investment in solar needs to improve outcomes if profitable.

- If investment is delayed and therefore ignored, the gains from the expansion will be lower. Numerically, we need to show that

$$\frac{\beta^N \beta^S}{\beta^N + \beta^S} (D - \frac{q^{solar}}{2}) > c,$$

which plugging in q^{solar} gives $\frac{c}{2} + \frac{\beta^N \beta^S}{\beta^N + \beta^S} \frac{D}{2} = \frac{c}{2} + \frac{p^*}{2} > c$, which holds as $p^* > c$ by assumption.

- If investment is anticipated but investment costs are ignored, we need to show that the missed gains from trade are smaller than the costs of solar. Numerically, we need to show

$$\beta^N (D^N - \frac{q^{solar}}{2}) < c,$$

which is by construction true as the equilibrium price is equal to c and larger than $\beta^N(D^N - q^{solar})$, the price in the North under solar investment and autarky.

□

Proof Observation 2

Proof. Price reductions being understated can be shown very generally. In full equilibrium, price reductions are $\bar{p} - p^{**}$, where $\bar{p}$ is the average price under autarky.

- Under early investment, price reductions are $\hat{p} - p^{**}$, where $\hat{p}$ is the average price under autarky but with solar investment. Because $\hat{p} < \bar{p}$, it follows that the difference is understated.
- Under late investment, price reductions are $\bar{p} - p^*$. Because $p^{**} < p^*$, it follows that the difference is understated.

□

Proof Observation 3

Proof. Under the assumption that prices converge after the interconnection, then price convergence is defined by the difference in the early period. Taking advantage that we have assumed that $p^N \leq p^S$,

- If investment is anticipated, $\hat{p}^N \leq p^N$, and thus $p^S - \hat{p}^N > p^S - p^N$.
- If investment is delayed, price differences are not distorted.

If the size of the transmission line is not enough for prices to converge, the result does not change if investment is anticipated, as the “after” equilibrium prices would be the same. For the case of investment delays, because net trade is smaller in the absence of investment, then price convergence is more likely if there is no investment. Therefore, price convergence might be overstated. Mathematically, net trade with solar investment is given by $\frac{\beta^S D^S - \beta^N (D^N - q^{solar})}{\beta^N + \beta^S}$ and net trade without solar investment is given by $\frac{\beta^S D^S - \beta^N D^N}{\beta^N + \beta^S}$, confirming that unrestricted trade is largest in the solar equilibrium.

If the constraint is binding, price differences will be weakly larger with solar investment. Visually, the offer curve from the North with solar is always to the right of the offer curve without solar and, therefore, for a restricted level of trade, the price difference will always be weakly larger with solar investment. Therefore, convergence will be higher in the absence of investment and binding transmission constraints.

□

B Short-run dispatch model details

We present here a fully fledged characterization of the short-run model with all the constraints explicitly spelled out.

Variables We solve for the following variables:

- q_{it} : Generation of each coal power plant, at most equal to the plant's capacity.
- $q_{gas_{it}}$: Natural gas generation at each cluster.
- $q_{solar_{ct}}$: Solar generation at each cluster, at most equal to available solar power that hour-day.
- $q_{wind_{ct}}$: Wind generation at each cluster, at most equal to available wind power that hour-day.
- $q_{hydro_{ct}}$: Hydro generation at each cluster, subject to seasonality and usage constraints (hourly min, hourly max, and total availability).
- d_{ct} : Output reaching final consumers at each cluster, equal or greater than demand, when there are constraints that require spilling power beyond renewables (e.g., due to autarky counterfactuals in which must-run production is higher than demand in a given region).
- $inflow_{zct}$: Power inflowing from line z into cluster c .
- $outflow_{zct}$: Power outflowing from line z into cluster c .

Objective function The planner minimizes the costs of production:

$$\min \sum_{c,t} \sum_{i \in c} c_{it} q_{it} + C_{gas,c}(q_{gas_{ct}}) + C_{hydro,c}(q_{hydro_{ct}}) + c_{solar} q_{solar_{ct}} + c_{wind} q_{wind_{ct}}.$$

The costs from coal generation come from the regulatory data. For SING, we use daily cost bids offered into the market. For SIC, we use block cost bids.

The costs for natural gas production are approximated based on the same bidding data. However, we face the challenge that not all cost bids that are offered into the market are actually available. The algorithm takes into account not only costs but also gas stocks to optimize production. Therefore, we estimate a supply curve at the cluster-month level based on realized gas production, rather than offered bids. We fit the supply curve as a piecewise linear function, which is attractive for optimization, with a breakpoint at the 75th percentile of generation, with the constraint that the curve is weakly increasing and convex. We limit total production to the maximum offered capacity. We also include lower bound and upper bound for natural gas production for each cluster-month, which is the minimum/maximum hourly observed gas production.

The data for hydro costs is taken also from the same cost bids. However, we face a similar challenge to the case of natural gas, as hydro production is subject to much more many constraints than those reflected in the cost bids. We approximate the supply of hydro as a piece-wise linear function given that hydro production at the cluster level is the

conjunction of several inter-related plants. We include a small marginal cost to solar and wind production to break ties in the presence of oversupply of renewable production. To circumvent the need for modeling the water basins in detail, we approximate from the data the observed cost of producing water at different levels with an estimated cost function. For each cluster-year-month, we regress the generation-weighted average price of hydro plants on total hydro generation in that cluster. The coefficient and constant define the hydro supply curve observed during those month conditions.³¹ We additionally include a lower and upper bound to hydro production based on the minimum and maximum observed hydro generation in that cluster-year-month.³²

Constraints The model is very simple given Chile's geography. To define the constraints for the network, we define the following matrix, which defines the lines are connected:

$$T = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1. \end{bmatrix}$$

Rows represent each cluster (dim=5) and columns represent each line (dim=4). There are four lines going from North to South. Cluster 1 is only connected to cluster 2 via line 1, cluster 2 is connected to 1 (line 1) and 3 (line 2), etc. In sum, line 1 connects 1 and 2, line 2 connects 2 and 3, line 3 connects 3 and 4, and line 4 connects 4 and 5.

The flow variables reflect net flows between clusters and are defined as positive variables. For a given line z and cluster c , either the inflow is positive or the outflow is positive, but not both. Outflows from cluster c in line z appear as inflows to the cluster to which the line connects. Outflows and inflows are limited by the size of the line, L_z . The size of the line can change depending on the scenario considered.

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &\leq inflow_{zct} \leq T_{zc}L_z, & \forall z, \forall c, \forall t \\ 0 &\leq outflow_{zct} \leq T_{zc}L_z, & \forall z, \forall c, \forall t, \\ \sum_c (inflow_{zct} - outflow_{zct}) &= 0, & \forall z, \forall t. \end{aligned}$$

This definition of flows add some redundancy, but it allows us to penalize inflows with high-voltage transmission

³¹We constrain the supply curve to be non-decreasing, and set the slope equal to zero whenever this constraint is binding and set the constant term to be mean(generation-weighted average price of hydro plants) in that cluster-year-month.

³²Note that the x-intercept of the hydro supply curve also sets an implicit lower bound on hydro production when the price is zero.


losses. This is reflected in the market clearing constraint:

$$\sum_{i \in c} q_{it} + q_{gas_{ct}} + q_{hydro_{ct}} + q_{solar_{ct}} + q_{wind_{ct}} + \sum_z \delta inflow_{zct} - \sum_z outflow_{zct} = \frac{d_{ct}}{1 - \gamma} \quad \forall z, \forall c, \forall t,$$

where δ represents losses across high-voltage lines and γ represents losses at the distribution level. We set $\delta = 0.025$ and $\gamma = 0.08$.

C Appendix Figures


Figure A.1: Observed Generation Cost and Nationwide Merit-order Cost




Note: This figure shows the observed system-level generation cost per MWh and the nationwide merit-order cost (the minimum possible generation cost per MWh with full trade), which are relevant to equation (1).

Figure A.2: Entry and Potential Exit of Thermal Plants

Panel A: Entry




Panel B: Potential Exit




Note: Panel A shows the cumulative entry of thermal plants. We use the first time of positive production to define unit-level entry and use unit-level capacity (MW) to show the cumulative entry in MW. Panel B shows the cumulative “potential” exit of thermal plants. We consider that a unit potentially exited if the unit does no longer offer its capacity to the system operator and do not produce at least for a year. For these units, we use the last time with submitted bids as the time of exit and use unit-level capacity (MW) to show cumulative exit in MW.

Figure A.3: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Transmission Investment: Interconnection only




Note: This figure shows the cost-benefit analysis of the interconnection, considering the case in which the interconnection was constructed but the reinforcement was not built.

Figure A.4: Alternative Approach to the Cost Benefit Analysis: Adding Solar Investment to the Cost



Note: This figure shows an alternative approach to the cost-benefit calculation of transmission investments. Please see descriptions in Section 6.

Figure A.5: Average Prices of a Subset of the Power Purchase Agreements (PPA)



Note: A subset of the power purchase agreements for the regulated customers (i.e., customers with less than 500 kW) are publicly available on the website of Licitaciones Eléctricas. Note that this dataset does not include bilateral contracts for customers with over 500 kW. Each dot represents the average price of the PPA for firms that have solar plants (note that the PPA is at the firm level rather than the plant level). The year labeled next each dot shows the contract start year. As a reference, we also show the system-level average spot market prices (weighted by generation) and the average spot market prices for solar plants in Atacama region (weighted by generation).

D Appendix Tables

Table A.1: Trade capacity

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3
Line 1	0.00	594.17	822.18
Line 2	313.68	586.28	1606.50
Line 3	322.35	580.62	1707.15
Line 4	1456.41	1520.62	1496.12

Note: This table shows the transmission capacity used in our structural model described in Section 5.2.

Table A.2: Generation ratio

	Renewable	Hydro	Coal	Natural gas	Other thermal	Total
Pre-interconnection						
Observed	9.9%	26.8%	39.9%	18.7%	4.7%	100.0%
Model-predicted	10.4%	26.8%	39.2%	15.8%	7.7%	100.0%
Post-interconnection, Pre-reinforcement						
Observed	12.4%	29.7%	37.3%	16.4%	4.2%	100.0%
Model-predicted	12.7%	29.6%	35.3%	14.6%	7.8%	100.0%
Post-reinforcement						
Observed	15.9%	27.2%	36.2%	17.4%	3.3%	100.0%
Model-predicted	16.0%	27.1%	37.4%	13.2%	6.4%	100.0%

Note: This table shows the goodness of fit of our structural model described in Section 5.2.

Table A.3: How Many Years Are Required to Make the Net Present Value of Solar Investment Positive?

Solar Capacity	Annual revenue	Number of years required
Panel A: Without Interconnection		
100% capacity	26293.4	More than 100 years
70% capacity	67638.3	More than 100 years
30% capacity	107529.4	26
25% capacity	111122.9	25
Panel B: Without Reinforcement		
100% capacity	104711.9	28
70% capacity	109326.4	25
30% capacity	112990.0	24
25% capacity	113423.0	24
Panel C: Actual scenario		
100% capacity	109094.1	25

Note: This table shows how many years are required to make the net present value of solar investment positive. See texts in Section 5.3.

Table A.4: An Alternative Dependent Variable to Static Event Study Analysis of the Impact of Market Integration

Dependent Variable: Generation Cost minus Nationwide Merit-Order Cost (USD/MWh)								
	Hour 12				All hours			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1(After the interconnection)	-1.42 (0.18)	-1.72 (0.22)	-1.73 (0.22)	-1.75 (0.22)	-1.00 (0.14)	-1.07 (0.17)	-1.07 (0.17)	-0.96 (0.17)
1(After the reinforcement)	-2.25 (0.11)	-0.87 (0.45)	-0.95 (0.47)	-1.14 (0.49)	-1.58 (0.09)	-0.83 (0.34)	-0.83 (0.36)	-1.04 (0.37)
Coal price [USD/ton]		0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Natural gas price [USD/m ³]			-4.26 (3.53)	-4.39 (3.59)			-0.01 (2.65)	0.33 (2.70)
Hydro availability				-0.26 (0.11)				-0.43 (0.11)
Scheduled demand (GWh)				0.20 (0.10)				0.02 (0.10)
Constant	6.58 (0.15)	3.25 (0.98)	3.71 (1.12)	2.76 (1.32)	5.88 (0.12)	3.93 (0.74)	3.93 (0.84)	4.92 (1.08)
Mean of dep var	5.17	5.17	5.17	5.17	4.89	4.89	4.89	4.89
Month FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample size	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041
R ²	0.26	0.56	0.56	0.56	0.21	0.58	0.58	0.59

Note: In our main analysis in Table 2, we use the generation cost (USD/MWh) as a dependent variable and the nationwide merit-order cost (i.e., the least possible generation cost that can be obtained without any trade constraints) as a control variable. In this table, we use the difference between the generation cost and nationwide merit-order cost as a dependent variable. The coefficients for the interconnection and reinforcement are very similar to the ones in Table 2.

Table A.5: An Alternative Control to Static Event Study Analysis of the Impact of Market Integration

Dependent Variable: Generation Cost (USD/MWh)								
	Hour 12				All hours			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1(After the interconnection)	-1.14 (0.14)	-2.08 (0.22)	-2.12 (0.21)	-2.08 (0.21)	-0.98 (0.13)	-1.30 (0.16)	-1.32 (0.16)	-1.21 (0.16)
1(After the reinforcement)	-3.07 (0.16)	-0.77 (0.45)	-0.99 (0.47)	-0.76 (0.46)	-1.89 (0.12)	-0.77 (0.33)	-0.85 (0.35)	-0.96 (0.36)
Minimum dispatch cost with no market integration	1.02 (0.01)	0.97 (0.02)	0.97 (0.02)	0.98 (0.02)	1.02 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)	0.97 (0.01)	0.97 (0.02)
Coal price [USD/ton]		0.06 (0.01)	0.06 (0.01)	0.06 (0.01)		0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Natural gas price [USD/m ³]			-11.84 (4.36)	-11.94 (4.35)			-3.93 (2.86)	-3.84 (2.94)
Hydro availability				0.28 (0.11)				-0.25 (0.11)
Scheduled demand (GWh)				-0.28 (0.10)				-0.15 (0.10)
Mean of dependent variable	36.12	36.12	36.12	36.12	38.87	38.87	38.87	38.87
Month FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample size	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041
R ²	0.94	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.97	0.97	0.97

Note: In our main analysis in Table 2, we use the nationwide merit-order cost (i.e., the least possible generation cost that can be obtained without any trade constraints) as a control variable. In this table, we use the minimum dispatch cost in the absence of market integration (i.e., the least possible generation cost that can be obtained in the absence of market integration) as a control variable.

Table A.6: Event Study Analysis With and Without Dynamic Correction

Panel A: Without Dynamic Correction

	Hour 12				All hours			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1(After the interconnection)	-1.50 (0.07)	-1.28 (0.07)	-1.28 (0.07)	-1.32 (0.07)	-0.70 (0.04)	-0.59 (0.03)	-0.59 (0.03)	-0.60 (0.03)
1(After the reinforcement)	0.15 (0.05)	-0.28 (0.12)	-0.29 (0.12)	-0.61 (0.13)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.19 (0.06)	-0.20 (0.06)	-0.25 (0.07)
Nationwide merit-order cost	1.05 (0.00)	1.06 (0.01)	1.06 (0.01)	1.05 (0.01)	1.01 (0.00)	1.02 (0.00)	1.02 (0.00)	1.02 (0.00)
Coal price [USD/ton]		-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)		-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Natural gas price [USD/m ³]			-0.54 (1.09)	-0.67 (1.18)			-0.34 (0.49)	-0.23 (0.50)
Hydro availability				-0.41 (0.05)				-0.10 (0.03)
Scheduled demand (GWh)				0.35 (0.04)				0.10 (0.02)
Mean of dependent variable	31.72	31.72	31.72	31.72	34.29	34.29	34.29	34.29
Month FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample size	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041
R ²	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Panel B: With Dynamic Correction

	Hour 12				All hours			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1(After the interconnection)	-2.84 (0.09)	-2.64 (0.08)	-2.64 (0.08)	-2.62 (0.08)	-1.24 (0.05)	-1.18 (0.04)	-1.18 (0.04)	-1.18 (0.04)
1(After the reinforcement)	-1.16 (0.06)	-1.58 (0.15)	-1.53 (0.15)	-1.89 (0.16)	-0.55 (0.03)	-0.68 (0.07)	-0.67 (0.07)	-0.72 (0.08)
Nationwide merit-order cost	1.05 (0.01)	1.05 (0.01)	1.05 (0.01)	1.06 (0.01)	1.00 (0.00)	1.02 (0.01)	1.02 (0.01)	1.02 (0.01)
Coal price [USD/ton]		-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)		-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Natural gas price [USD/m ³]			2.38 (1.27)	2.11 (1.33)			0.56 (0.55)	0.67 (0.57)
Hydro availability				-0.48 (0.05)				-0.11 (0.04)
Scheduled demand (GWh)				0.24 (0.05)				0.08 (0.03)
Mean of dependent variable	33.17	33.17	33.17	33.17	34.89	34.89	34.89	34.89
Month FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample size	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041	1041
R ²	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Note: This table shows event study regression results reported in Table 4.

Table A.7: Counterfactual Simulations: Impacts of the Interconnection and Impacts of the Reinforcement

Panel A: Impact of the Interconnection					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Interconnection only	No interconnection		Impacts of interconnection	
		Without dynamic correction	With dynamic correction	(1)-(2) Without correction	(1)-(3) With correction
Solar generation (GWh/day)	13.41	13.10	9.85	0.31 (+2%)	3.56 (+36%)
Generation cost (USD/MWh): all hours	37.15	37.48	38.20	-0.33 (-1%)	-1.05 (-3%)
Generation cost (USD/MWh): hour 12	34.71	35.16	37.07	-0.45 (-1%)	-2.36 (-6%)
Daily price in all regions (USD/MWh)	49.46	50.05	50.85	-0.58 (-1%)	-1.39 (-3%)
Price at noon in all regions (USD/MWh)	50.17	50.60	52.37	-0.43 (-1%)	-2.20 (-4%)
Price at noon in Atacama (USD/MWh)	47.06	35.60	53.35	11.46 (+32%)	-6.29 (-12%)
Price at noon in Santiago (USD/MWh)	52.29	54.50	55.09	-2.20 (-4%)	-2.79 (-5%)
Price difference (Santiago - Atacama)	5.23	18.90	1.74	-13.66 (-72%)	3.50 (+201%)
Panel B: Impact of the Reinforcement					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Actual Interconnection and reinforcement	Interconnection only		Impacts of reinforcement	
		Without dynamic correction	With dynamic correction	(1)-(2) Without correction	(1)-(3) With correction
Solar generation (GWh/day)	18.48	18.44	15.99	0.04 (+0%)	2.48 (+16%)
Generation cost (USD/MWh): all hours	27.14	27.43	27.78	-0.29 (-1%)	-0.64 (-2%)
Generation cost (USD/MWh): hour 12	23.91	24.61	25.49	-0.70 (-3%)	-1.58 (-6%)
Daily price in all regions (USD/MWh)	36.60	37.91	38.04	-1.32 (-3%)	-1.45 (-4%)
Price at noon in all regions (USD/MWh)	35.88	37.82	38.04	-1.94 (-5%)	-2.16 (-6%)
Price at noon in Atacama (USD/MWh)	34.03	29.87	32.02	4.17 (+14%)	2.01 (+6%)
Price at noon in Santiago (USD/MWh)	37.22	41.37	41.39	-4.15 (-10%)	-4.16 (-10%)
Price difference (Santiago - Atacama)	3.19	11.51	9.37	-8.32 (-72%)	-6.18 (-66%)

Note: This table shows counterfactual simulation results reported in Table 4.

Table A.8: Emissions and Externality for the Cost-Benefit Analysis

Panel A: interconnection + reinforcement						
	Renewable	Hydro	Coal	Natural gas	Other thermal	Total
Generation ratio						
Full mkt integration	12.8%	28.7%	37.1%	13.9%	7.5%	100.0%
No mkt integration (static)	11.9%	28.8%	36.6%	15.1%	7.6%	100.0%
No mkt integration (dynamic)	10.0%	28.8%	37.7%	15.9%	7.6%	100.0%
Generation level (GWh)						
Full mkt integration	26.6	59.7	77.4	29.1	15.5	208.4
No mkt integration (static)	24.6	59.8	76.0	31.6	15.8	207.9
No mkt integration (dynamic)	20.7	59.9	78.3	33.1	15.8	207.8
Emission level (tons of CO2)						
Full mkt integration	0.0	0.0	64278.8	9878.6	0.1	74157.5
No mkt integration (static)	0.0	0.0	63099.9	10738.9	22.7	73861.4
No mkt integration (dynamic)	0.0	0.0	64975.5	11261.7	33.3	76270.5
Non-carbon externality (1000 USD)						
Full mkt integration	0.0	0.0	2633.1	58.1	0.0	2691.2
No mkt integration (static)	0.0	0.0	2584.8	63.2	0.0	2648.0
No mkt integration (dynamic)	0.0	0.0	2661.6	66.2	0.0	2727.9
Panel B: interconnection only						
	Renewable	Hydro	Coal	Natural gas	Other thermal	Total
Generation ratio						
Interconnection	11.7%	28.7%	37.2%	14.8%	7.6%	100.0%
No interconnection (static)	11.4%	28.8%	36.8%	15.4%	7.6%	100.0%
No interconnection (dynamic)	10.0%	28.8%	37.7%	15.9%	7.6%	100.0%
Generation level (GWh)						
Interconnection	24.3	59.8	77.5	30.9	15.7	208.1
No interconnection (static)	23.6	59.9	76.5	32.1	15.8	207.9
No interconnection (dynamic)	20.7	59.9	78.3	33.1	15.8	207.8
Emission level (tons of CO2)						
Interconnection	0.0	0.0	64301.4	10495.4	1.2	74798.0
No interconnection (static)	0.0	0.0	63464.0	10924.2	23.5	74411.7
No interconnection (dynamic)	0.0	0.0	64975.5	11261.7	33.3	76270.5
Non-carbon externality (1000 USD)						
Interconnection	0.0	0.0	2634.0	61.7	0.0	2695.8
No interconnection (static)	0.0	0.0	2599.7	64.3	0.0	2664.0
No interconnection (dynamic)	0.0	0.0	2661.6	66.2	0.0	2727.9

Note: This table shows emissions and externalities used in the cost-benefit calculation in Section 6.